This book is a collection of 14 essays; 11 of these have been previously published and three are new. All but one of them have been written since 1993 when my essay collection Supervenience and Mind appeared. Essays used in the monographs, Mind in a Physical World and Physicalism, Or Something Near Enough, have been excluded. The book begins with four essays on emergence and related issues; in.
Argumentative Persuasive Philosophy Papers - Reviving Psychophysical Supervenience. Style and Supervenience Essay example - Style and Supervenience ABSTRACT: Cope's Computers and Musical Style (1991) describes a computer program that allegedly can represent and replicate musical styles solely on the basis of compositions that have been entered into it.
Jaegwon Kim is one of the most preeminent and most influential contributors to the philosophy of mind and metaphysics. This collection of essays presents the core of his work on supervenience and mind with two sets of postscripts especially written for the book. The essays focus on such issues as the nature of causation and events, what dependency relations other than causal relations connect.
The supervenience character of the aesthetic and its anticipatory value 5. A brief genealogy of the notion of supervenience 6. Supervenience and epigenesis of the aesthetic sense 7. From the aesthetic faculty to the aesthetic device. On an essay of Terrence W. Deacon 8. The evolutionary meaning of the aesthetic-fictional activities. The neo.
This book, based on Jaegwon Kim's 1996 Townsend Lectures, presents the philosopher's current views on a variety of issues in the metaphysics of the mind--in particular, the mind-body problem, mental causation, and reductionism. This book, based on Jaegwon Kim's 1996 Townsend Lectures, presents the philosopher's current views on a variety of issues in the metaphysics of the mind--in particular.
Kim construes the mind-body problem as that of finding a place for the mind in a world that is fundamentally physical. Among other points, he redefines the roles of supervenience and emergence in the discussion of the mind-body problem. Arguing that various contemporary accounts of mental causation are inadequate, he offers his own partially.
The result of trying to save the supposed asymmetry of supervenience by appealing to an implied interlevel in-virtue-of or explanation relation is non-transitivity of supervenience, which is inconsistent with the transitivity required for marshaling adequate evidential support for the physicalist's claim that everything nonphysical supervenes on the physical.
This essay addresses the problem of logically modelling the concept of normative supervenience. We will argue that alternatives of classical logic can grasp specific aspects of this concept. We will examine two cases: (a) the idea of institutional supervenience corresponding to the counts-as relation, (b) modal logics for jumping or generating the normative dimension of supervenient properties.
In this paper, I argue that while supervenience accounts of mental causation in general have difficulty avoiding epiphenomenalism, the situation is particularly bad in the case of conscious experiences since the function-realizer relation, arguably present in the case of intentional properties, does not obtain, and thus, the metaphysical link between supervenient and subvenient properties is.
But instead of relying on one of the many arguments against this doctrine, he launches a new attack. Convinced that existing arguments for and against Humean supervenience depend on specific accounts of natural laws, Lange proposes a critique that purports to be independent of substantive views on how natural laws should be interpreted. 1.
In Part I, the author presents the argument for nonreductive individualism by working through the implications of supervenience, multiple realizability, and wild disjunction in some detail. In Part II, he extends the argument to provide a defense for social causal laws, and this account of social causation does not require any commitment to intentionality or agency on the part of individuals.
The plan of the essay is as follows: in the first section I consider Brandom’s arguments against the reducibility of attitudes to dispositions and argue that they are less than conclusive. In the second section I will then contend that Brandom’s thesis of the supervenience of norms on deontic statuses and hence on normative attitudes is untenable, because norms are indeed reducible to.